## **CLAIMS**

What is claimed is:

1	1. A method of preventing an attack on a network, wherein the attack comprises
2	injecting a spurious transmission control protocol (TCP) segment into a TCP connection
3	between a sender and a receiver, the method comprising the computer-implemented steps of:
4	receiving a duplicate TCP ACK message;
5	incrementing a false duplicate ACK counter when a TCP re-transmission buffer
6	maintained by the receiver is empty;
7	when the false duplicate ACK counter is equal to a specified strike factor, sending a
8	corrective ACK message that provides a correct sequence value and ACK
9	value.
1	2. A method as recited in Claim 1, wherein the specified strike factor is a value in a
2	range of 1 to 10.
1	3. A method as recited in Claim 1, wherein the steps are performed by an endpoint node
2	acting as the receiver of data in the TCP connection.
1	4. A method as recited in Claim 1, wherein the steps are performed by a TCP
2	application of an operating system of a network infrastructure element.
1	5. A method as recited in Claim 1, wherein the steps are performed by a TCP process,
2	stack, adapter or agent hosted by or associated with an operating system of a personal
3	computer, workstation or other network end station

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determining whether the correct sequence value is less than another sequence value of

A method as recited in Claim 1, further comprising the steps of:

receiving the corrective ACK message;

a segment in a re-assembly buffer;

- discarding the segment from the re-assembly buffer when the correct sequence value is less than the other sequence value of a segment in the re-assembly buffer.
- 7. A method as recited in Claim 6, wherein the discarding step comprises discarding all segments in the re-assembly buffer.
- 1 8. A method of preventing an attack on a network, wherein the attack comprises 2 injecting a spurious transmission control protocol (TCP) segment into a TCP connection 3 between a sender and a receiver, the method comprising the computer-implemented steps of: 4 receiving a particular TCP segment; 5 determining a sequence value gap as between the particular TCP segment and a prior 6 TCP segment previously placed in a re-assembly buffer maintained by the 7 receiver: 8 determining whether the sequence value gap is too large according to a specified 9 heuristic; 10 if the sequence value gap is too large, then performing the steps of: 11 creating and sending a dummy segment carrying a particular sequence value 12 that is just prior to a last properly acknowledged sequence value: 13 receiving an acknowledgment of the dummy segment: 14 determining whether a second sequence value carried in the acknowledgment 15 is less than a third sequence value of the first TCP segment; and 16 discarding the particular TCP segment from the re-assembly buffer when the 17 second sequence value carried in the acknowledgment is less than the 18 third sequence value of the particular TCP segment.
- 9. A method as recited in Claim 8, wherein the specified heuristic holds when a reassembly gap value is greater than one-half of a then-current window size.
- 1 10. A method as recited in Claim 8, wherein the specified heuristic holds when a re-
- 2 assembly gap value is greater than the lesser of (a) one-half of a then-current window size or
- 3 (b) a multiple of a maximum allowed segment size.

- 1 11. A method as recited in Claim 8, wherein the specified heuristic holds when a query
- 2 threshold is greater than a function of then-current bandwidth and then-current delay.
- 1 12. A method as recited in Claim 8, wherein the specified heuristic holds when a query
- 2 threshold is greater than a function of a round-trip time (RTT) estimate, a then-current
- 3 available bandwidth value, and window size.
- 1 13. A method as recited in Claim 8, wherein the specified heuristic holds when a query
- 2 threshold value is less than or equal to a re-assembly gap value and the re-assembly gap
- 3 value is less than or equal to a receive window value.
- 1 14. A method as recited in Claim 13, wherein the re-assembly gap value comprises a
- 2 sequence value of a first segment in the re-assembly buffer less a next expected segment
- 3 value.
- 4 15. An apparatus for preventing an attack on a network, wherein the attack comprises
- 5 sending a spurious transmission control protocol (TCP) segment with a spurious or unwanted
- 6 DATA segment, comprising means for performing any of the steps of Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
- 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, or 14.
- 1 16. An apparatus for preventing an attack on a network, wherein the attack comprises
- 2 sending a spurious transmission control protocol (TCP) segment with spurious or
- 3 unwanted DATA segment, comprising:
- 4 a processor;
- 5 one or more stored sequences of instructions that are accessible to the processor and
- 6 which, when executed by the processor, cause the processor to carry out the
- 7 steps of any of Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, or 14.

- 1 17. A computer-readable medium carrying one or more sequences of instructions for
- 2 preventing an attack on a network, wherein the attack comprises sending a spurious
- 3 transmission control protocol (TCP) segment with unwanted or spurious DATA, wherein the
- 4 execution of the one or more sequences of instructions by one or more processors causes the
- one or more processors to perform the steps of any of Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
- 6 12, 13, or 14.